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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nathan Lee Howard appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
During the summer of 2019, law enforcement began investigating Howard and others for
the ongoing theft of firewood from the national forest. (R., pp.55-56.) In October 2019, Deputy
Jakich saw Howard hauling a load of cut firewood. (R., p.55.) He did not see a U.S. Forest Service
load ticket affixed to the load of firewood. (Id. 1) Deputy Jakich initiated a traffic stop because he
believed Howard had stolen the firewood from the national forest. (R., pp.55-56.) A subsequent
search of Howard’s pickup truck yielded controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. (R., p.57.)
The state charged Howard with possession of methamphetamine, unlawful transportation
of forest products, and possession of mushrooms. (R., pp.24-25.) Howard pled not guilty and
filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.28, 39-41.) He asserted Deputy Jakich lacked the reasonable
suspicion necessary to conduct a traffic stop. (R., pp.39-47.) The state did not file a response.
(See R., pp.5-6.)
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Title 36 section 261.6(e) of the Code of Federal Regulations prohibits “hauling timber or other
forest product acquired under any permit … unless such product is identified as required in such
permit.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(e). To identify firewood taken from a national forest, the general
conditions of a U.S. Forest Service personal use permit require the individual hauling such
firewood to “remove [the] month and day notches” from the load ticket and to “securely [attach]”
the notched ticket “in a visible position on the left rear of the load” before transporting it. (State’s
Exs.1-2.)
1

The district court held a suppression hearing. (R., pp.48-50; see generally 1/13/20 Tr.)
During the hearing, Howard argued that Deputy Jakich stopped him on a mere hunch that the wood
he was transporting was stolen from the national forest, and thus the traffic stop amounted to a
fishing expedition unsupported by reasonable suspicion. (1/13/20 Tr., p.37, L.24 – p.40, L.21.)
The state argued that Howard’s traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. (1/13/20 Tr.,
p.40, L.24 – p.42, L.25.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop
was justified by reasonable suspicion under a totality of the circumstances. (R., pp.55-62.)
Howard subsequently pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine pursuant to a plea
agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.66-67, 7174; 2/24/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-19; p.12, Ls.4-16. 2) In exchange for his guilty plea, the state moved to
dismiss the two remaining counts. (R., pp.73, 81.) The district court imposed a suspended
sentence of four years, with one and one-half years determinate, and placed Howard on probation
for three years. (R., pp.78-80, 82-84; 5/18/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.12-19.)
Howard timely appealed. (R., pp.94-96.)
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The transcript of the sentencing hearings is contained in the document entitled “Supplemental
Record Appeal.”
2

ISSUE
Howard states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Howard’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Howard failed to show the district court erred when it denied the motion to suppress?

3

ARGUMENT
Howard Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied The Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Howard asserts that the district court erred when it denied the motion to

suppress because Deputy Jakich lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-16.) Howard’s argument lacks merit. The district court properly denied
the suppression motion because the specific, articulable facts in Deputy Jakich’s possession and
the rational inferences that he drew from those facts amounted to a reasonable suspicion that
Howard was transporting stolen firewood.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of the trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to suppress

is bifurcated. State v. Rebo, 168 Idaho 234, ___, 482 P.3d 569, 572 (2020). When the trial court’s
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate courts accept the trial court’s findings
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).
“Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.” State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,
111, 294 P.3d 1121, 1123 (2013) (citation omitted).
C.

Howard’s Traffic Stop Was Justified By Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable searches

and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the
vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho

4

559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). “[T]wo possible justifications for a traffic stop
exist: (1) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver has committed … a
traffic offense, or (2) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged
in other criminal activity.” State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 588, 416 P.3d 957, 960 (2018) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (holding the Fourth
Amendment is satisfied if the officer conducting the brief investigatory stop has reasonable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot).
“The standard of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ is not a particularly high or onerous
standard to meet.” State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012). “The officer
must simply be acting on more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific,
articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citations omitted). An officer may draw
reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn
from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319,
321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). The reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion must be
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho
474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999).
In this case, the district court’s unchallenged factual findings show that Howard’s traffic
stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Before Deputy Jakich encountered
Howard on the night of the stop, he possessed several pieces of information that tied Howard to
the ongoing theft of firewood from the national forest. Deputy Jakich knew that there had recently
been an increase in the theft of firewood from the national forest, that Howard had a large amount

5

of cut firewood in his yard throughout the firewood cutting season, and that Howard was
advertising the sale of firewood on Facebook. (R., pp.55-56.) He also knew there was an ongoing
investigation into the firewood thefts that started with Howard and evolved to include other
suspects. (See id.) As a result of the investigation, Deputy Jakich learned the pattern of conduct
exhibited by the individuals suspected of stealing firewood from the national forest. (R., p.56.)
The suspects would go to the national forest late in the afternoon, harvest firewood, transport it
without load tickets affixed, split it for sale, and then transport it to the buyers at night. (Id.)
In addition, Deputy Jakich was aware that Howard had been stopped by Deputy
Loudermilk in September 2019 and warned for hauling firewood with un-notched load tickets.
(R., p.56; see 1/13/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.6-18.) During that stop, Howard admitted that he was
harvesting firewood from the national forest and stated that he intended to reuse his un-notched
load tickets to haul future loads. (Id.) Deputy Loudermilk let Howard go with a warning, but he
informed Deputy Jakich and the other officers involved in the firewood theft investigation about
the encounter. (R., p.56.)
Equipped with all this information, Deputy Jakich observed Howard hauling a load of cut
firewood at around 10:30 p.m. on October 10, 2019. (R., p.55.) Deputy Jakich noticed that the
load of firewood did not have any U.S. Forest Service load tickets affixed. (Id.) Deputy Jakich
stopped Howard based on a suspicion that he was stealing the firewood from the national forest.
(R., p.60; 1/13/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-17.) Deputy Loudermilk arrived to assist with the stop and both
deputies worked to confirm or dispel the suspicion that the firewood being hauled was stolen from
the national forest. (See R., p.57; 1/13/20 Tr., p.34, L.13 – p.35, L.5.)
Based on the information known to Deputy Jakich before he encountered Howard on the
night of the stop, it was reasonable to infer that the firewood in Howard’s trailer was unlawfully
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taken from the national forest. At the time of the stop, Howard was under investigation for taking
firewood from the national forest without a permit. (R., p.59.) His conduct on the night of the
stop matched the pattern of behavior Deputy Jakich knew to be characteristic of the suspects in the
ongoing firewood theft investigation. (See R., p.60.) It was also consistent with his own conduct
in September when he admitted to harvesting firewood from the national forest and admitted that
he intended to haul future loads of firewood from the national forest. (See R., p.60.) The district
court correctly concluded that under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Deputy Jakich to
infer that the firewood in the trailer came from federal land. (See R., pp.57-59.)
Taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances, Deputy Jakich was not acting on
a mere hunch when he initiated the traffic stop. Rather, he was acting according to the specific,
articulable facts in his possession that tied Howard to the ongoing theft of firewood from the
national forest as well as the rational inferences that he was entitled to draw from those facts.
Under a totality of the circumstances, the facts and inferences relied on by Deputy Jakich amount
to a reasonable suspicion that Howard was transporting firewood that he had stolen from the
national forest. Thus, Deputy Jakich was justified in stopping Howard to confirm or dispel that
suspicion.
Howard asserts that Deputy Jakich seized him without reasonable suspicion. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.8-17.) Howard makes three discrete arguments in support of an overarching claim that
the lack of a visible load ticket should have no bearing on the reasonable suspicion analysis. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp.9-13.) His arguments are inapposite and otherwise fail on their merits.
Howard’s arguments are inapposite because Deputy Jakich had reasonable suspicion to
support the traffic stop even without considering the lack of a visible load ticket. Deputy Jakich
stopped Howard on suspicion that the firewood in his trailer was stolen from the national forest.
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(1/13/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-17; R., p.60.) The lack of a visible load ticket was just one of the many
facts and inferences Deputy Jakich relied upon when he stopped Howard. (R., pp.55-61.) Even
removing the single fact that Howard’s load of firewood lacked a visible load ticket from the
reasonable suspicion analysis, Deputy Jakich had reasonable suspicion that the firewood was
stolen based on the other facts known to him. (See R., p.61.) Because Deputy Jakich had
reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop based on the information in his possession even
without consideration of the lack of a load ticket, Howard’s arguments as to why the lack of a load
ticket should have no bearing on the reasonable suspicion analysis are irrelevant. But even if the
Court considers the merits of these arguments, they are unavailing.
First, Howard argues that whether a load ticket was affixed to the wood he was hauling is
not relevant to the reasonable suspicion inquiry because Deputy Jakich had no basis for inferring
the wood in his trailer came from the national forest rather than private land and load tickets need
only be attached to wood harvested from the national forest. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10) He is
incorrect in both respects. As shown above, Deputy Jakich possessed numerous pieces of
information that tied Howard to the ongoing theft of firewood from the national forest before he
encountered Howard on the night of the stop. The information in Deputy Jakich’s possession
together with his own observations served as a basis from which he could reasonable infer that the
firewood in Howard’s trailer originated from the national forest, not private land. (R., p.59.)
Furthermore, it is precisely because Deputy Jakich inferred that the firewood in Howard’s
trailer was taken from federal land that whether a load ticket was affixed to the load is a relevant
fact in the reasonable suspicion inquiry. Federal regulations require firewood removed from the
national forest pursuant to a personal use permit to be identified by securely attached load tickets.
36 C.F.R. §§ 261.6(e) and 261.6(h); (see
- - -also
- - State’s Exs.1-2). Therefore, the absence of an
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attached load ticket was a specific, articulable fact properly considered by the district court in the
reasonable suspicion analysis. Howard has failed to show otherwise.
Second, Howard argues that even if the wood he was hauling was in fact harvested from
the national forest, the securely attached load ticket requirement did not apply because he was not
“leaving the permit area or moving between collection sites when Deputy Jakich pulled him over.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) Howard’s factual claim that he was not leaving the national forest
or moving between collection sites is unsubstantiated in the record. It has no basis in the district
court’s findings of fact and there is a dearth of evidence in the record to support it. (R., pp.55-57;
see generally 1/13/20 Tr.) Also, he has not otherwise challenged the district court’s factual
findings as clearly erroneous. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-12.) Accordingly, this argument fails.
Howard also argues that the securely attached load ticket requirement does not apply to
firewood after it has been processed. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) He is incorrect. Howard has
not provided any authority in support of this argument other than the plain language of the
regulations and the conditions of the personal use permit. (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) However,
neither the regulations nor the conditions of the permit exempt permittees transporting cut
firewood from the securely attached load ticket requirement. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.6(e), 261.6(h);
(State’s Exs.1-2). Were that the case, any person harvesting firewood from the national forest
could presumably circumvent federal regulation and nullify the purpose of personal use permits
by simply processing the wood at the collection site before removing it from the national forest.
Furthermore, contrary to Howard’s contention, the plain language of the personal use
permits indicates that the securely attached load ticket requirement applies to firewood cut for sale.
Individuals “hauling timber or other forest product acquired under any permit” must identify the
product being hauled “as required in such permit.” 36 C.F.R. § 261.6(e). To identify firewood
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harvested from the national forest, the conditions of the U.S. Forest Service’s personal use permit
prohibit individuals from transporting “fuelwood without first validating and securely attaching
the load tickets in a visible position on the left rear of the load for each 1/4 cord of wood products
or any portion thereof.” (State’s Ex.2 (emphasis added).) The load tickets state, “One load ticket
must be used for each 1/4 cord of fuelwood being transported.” (State’s Ex.1 (underline in
original, italics added.) The term “cord” is not defined in the regulations. See 36 C.F.R. § 261.2.
Nevertheless, it is ordinarily defined as “a measure of cut wood, usually 128 cubic feet.” Cord,
The New Oxford American Dictionary (2001) (emphasis added); see also Cord, MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) (“a unit of wood cut for fuel equal to a stack 4 x
4 x 8 feet or 128 cubic feet” (emphasis added)). 3 Because the plain language of the permit requires
one load ticket to be securely attached to the load for each 32 cubed feet of cut wood, the securely
attached load ticket requirement applied by definition to the firewood in Howard’s trailer.
Third, Howard argues that the lack of a load ticket “cannot provide an alternative
justification for the stop” because the securely attached load ticket requirement is
unconstitutionally vague “as applied to the transportation of wood, after wood has been processed
for use.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13 (emphasis in original).) This argument is irrelevant. The
dispositive issue in this case is whether Deputy Jakich had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic
stop. The state has never taken the position that the lack of a load ticket alone provided an
alternative justification for Howard’s traffic stop. As the district court recognized, “whether a lack
of a permit alone creates reasonable suspicion to stop an individual on suspicion of violating I.C.
§ 18-4628 is a question for another day.” (R., p.62, n.2.) The district court correctly concluded

3

Both dictionaries are accessible at the Idaho State Law Library.
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that Deputy Jakich had many facts in his possession that justified Howard’s traffic stop under a
totality of the circumstances.
Finally, Howard argues that Deputy Jakich lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop
in light of some “exculpatory facts.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.) Specifically, Howard relies
on the fact that Deputy Jakich “conceded he did not know whether the firewood on Mr. Howard’s
trailer had come from the National Forest” during the suppression hearing. (Appellant’s brief,
p.14.) Deputy Jakich certainly acknowledged that he was “not 100 percent” sure that the firewood
in Howard’s trailer was harvested from the national forest. (1/13/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-7.) But, the
reasonable suspicion standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment does not impose a requirement
that law enforcement have knowledge of criminal activity to an absolute certainty before
conducting a limited seizure. The Fourth Amendment tolerates investigatory detentions based on
less than certain knowledge of criminal activity. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (limited investigatory
detentions are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has “reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” (emphasis added)). That Deputy Jakich was not one
hundred percent sure that the firewood in Howard’s trailer was harvested from the national forest
prior to stopping him carries little weight, if any, in the reasonable suspicion analysis. Deputy
Jakich was justified in stopping Howard to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the wood in the
trailer was stolen from the national forest because he relied upon specific, articulable facts and
rational inferences drawn from those facts in doing so. (See R., p.57.)
Howard also contends that Deputy Jakich’s observations on the night of the stop were not
consistent with Howard’s previous stop because during the prior stop he actually had a load ticket
on his truck when he was stopped and he “had just come off the National Forest.” (Appellant’s
brief pp.15-16.) Howard’s claim that he was stopped by Deputy Loudermilk just after leaving the
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national forest is not supported by any evidence in the record or the district court’s factual findings.
(R., pp.55-57; see generally 1/13/20 Tr.) Deputy Loudermilk simply testified that he stopped
Howard as he was “driving through Cambridge with a load of firewood.” (1/13/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.518.) Similarly, Deputy Jakich testified that he stopped Howard “south of Weiser on [Highway]
95, near Mecum Road” driving with a trailer of split firewood. (1/13/20 Tr., p.7, L.17 – p.9, L.13;
p.22, Ls.22-23.) In both instances, Howard was hauling firewood while under investigation for
the ongoing theft of firewood from the national forest. (R., pp.55-56.) Likewise, in both instances,
Howard had not properly affixed load tickets to the firewood he was hauling. During the stop in
September, Howard had load tickets on his truck, but they were not notched in accordance with
the relevant regulations. (1/13/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.5-18.) During the second stop in October, Howard
did not have any load tickets affixed to his load of firewood, in violation of the federal regulations.
(R., p.55.) Contrary to Howard’s claim, the facts underlying the two stops are strikingly consistent.
He has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that Howard’s conduct on the night
of the second stop was consistent with the prior incident.
Howard also cites several other exculpatory facts. (Appellant’s brief, p.14.) However,
none of the exculpatory facts mentioned by Howard negate Deputy Jakich’s reasonable suspicion.
Furthermore, Howard ignores the fact that he called Deputy Jakich to testify, yet he did not inquire
about whether the wood Howard was advertising for sale on Facebook was suspected to be stolen.
(See generally 1/13/20 Tr., p.5, L.23 – p.23, L.19.) Likewise, he did not inquire about whether
Deputy Jakich had any information that Howard was legally harvesting and selling firewood. (Id.)
The reason Deputy Jakich did not testify about such things is because he was never asked. Had
Howard’s trial counsel thought such testimony was relevant and exculpatory, he certainly had the
opportunity to elicit such testimony from Deputy Jakich. Yet, he did not do so. (Id.) Considering
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all of the information known to Deputy Jakich prior to the traffic stop, the stop was supported by
a reasonable suspicion that Howard was stealing firewood from the national forest. Howard has
failed to show otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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